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Abstract   
Context: The high cost of new prescription drugs and other medical products is an important 
health policy issue. A recent study of patent records revealed 153 drugs and vaccines discovered 
at public-sector research institutions, including government laboratories. A controversial solution 
in these cases is the use of government march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, through which 
the government invokes legal rights in the patents protecting products developed from public 
funding. 
 
Methods: We conducted a primary-source document review of the Bayh-Dole Act’s legislative 
history as well as of hearings of past march-in rights petitions to the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH). We then conducted semi-structured interviews of 12 key experts in the march-in rights of 
the Bayh-Dole Act to identify the sources of the disputes and the main themes in the statute’s 
implementation. We analyzed the interview transcripts using standard qualitative techniques. 
 
Findings: Since 1980, the NIH has fully reviewed 5 petitions to invoke march-in rights for 4 
health-related technologies or medical products developed from discoveries resulting from 
federal funding. Three of these requests related to reducing the high prices of brand-name drugs, 
one related to relieving a drug shortage, and one related to a potentially patent-infringing medical 
device. In each of these cases, the NIH rejected the requests. Interviewees were divided on the 
implications of these experiences, finding the NIH’s reluctance to issue march-in rights to be 
evidence of either a system working as intended or of a flawed system needing reform. 
 
Conclusions: The Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in rights continue to be invoked by policymakers and 
health advocates, most recently in the context of new, high-cost products originally discovered 
with federally funded research. We found that march-in rights may select for government 
research licensees more likely to commercialize the results and that they can be used to extract 
minor concessions from licensees. But as currently designed in the statute, the march-in rights 
are unlikely to serve as a counterweight to lower the prices of medical products arising from 
federally funded research. 
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Glossary  
NIH: National Institutes of Health 
FDA: United States Food and Drug Administration  
HAART: highly active antiretroviral therapy  
FTC: Federal Trade Commission  
NIAID: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases  
NICE: National Institute for Health Care Excellence  
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980: U.S. Congressional legislation that formalized the process of licensing 
patents developed from federally funded research at U.S.-based universities to commercial 
entities.  
March-in rights: a provision in the Bayh-Dole Act that allowed the US government to exercise 
its authority and cancel the exclusive license if the licensee was not taking adequate steps to 
commercialize or not meeting the needs of the American public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! ! !! %!
Introduction  
Research funded by US taxpayers has contributed to the development of some of the most 
transformative drugs available to patients, including the anticancer drug imatinib (Gleevec), 
tumor necrosis factor blockers like infliximab (Remicade) and etanercept (Enbrel) useful in 
inflammatory rheumatologic and gastroenterologic diseases, and vascular endothelial growth 
factor inhibitors like bevacizumab (Avastin) for cancer and eye diseases.1 One comprehensive 
review of patent records found that government resources had directly contributed to the 
discovery of 153 marketed drugs and vaccines, including some of the most transformative 
medicines developed in the past 20 years.2 Commercialization of products based on government 
investment in research was a central tenant of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allowed 
universities to patent the results of federally funded research and then to license these patents to 
commercial entities, obligating the institutions to claim those rights to promote the 
commercialization of the inventions. 
 The Bayh-Dole Act also included a controversial provision intended to ensure that the 
final products emerging from this government-sponsored research would be available to the 
public on reasonable terms. This provision was march-in rights, specific legal rights that the 
government retains for products originating with the government’s financial support. Before the 
Bayh-Dole Act, patents obtained on federally funded work remained in the government’s 
control, although concern grew that the government was not actively seeking licenses to develop 
commercial products and there was not a cohesive licensing protocol across government 
agencies. In the 1960s and 1970s, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and a small number of 
research universities designed institutional patent agreements to transfer the patent title from the 
government to the universities to encourage more active development. In these agreements, the 
government maintained march-in rights to reclaim the invention if the licensees were not taking 
adequate steps to commercialize the product or meeting the needs of American consumers. Thus, 
to “march in” means that the government exercises its authority, takes control of the invention, 
and cancels the grant of an exclusive license for an invention that its funds helped develop. In 
doing so, the government regains the authority to relicense the intellectual property to another 
party. This process of contingent patent title transfer with march-in rights was formalized when 
the Bayh-Dole Act made the process consistent across all federal agencies. 
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 In recent years, the possibility of exercising Bayh-Dole’s march-in rights has been 
invoked most consistently in the context of high-cost medical products that can be traced back to 
scientists at public-sector research institutions working with government funds. Clinicians and 
policymakers continue to express concern about the prices of new drugs for cancer,3 essential 
genetic tests,4 and medical devices.5 In July 2013, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) submitted 
another petition relating to Myriad’s genetic tests for predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer 
after Myriad sought to block competition in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
its genetic code patents.6 Senator Leahy argued that the essential discoveries leading to Myriad’s 
test were developed with government funding, yet the test was too expensive for millions of 
women. He believed this insufficient access could be remedied using march-in rights. In 2014, 
an expert economist and law professor made a similar argument related to the cost of sofosbuvir 
(Sovaldi),7 the $1,000-per-pill treatment for hepatitis C virus sold by Gilead but originally 
discovered by a company founded by a faculty member at Emory University, much of whose 
work on the usefulness of nucleoside viral inhibitors was federally funded.8 In 2016, the health 
advocacy group Knowledge Ecology International petitioned for march-in rights use for the 
prostate cancer drug enzalutamide (Xtandi), which was developed with federal funding at UCLA 
and is priced significantly higher in the US than other comparable nations.52 Lastly, 
Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) led over 50 members of the House of Representatives in 
sending a letter to the NIH, urging them to use march-in rights as a means to combat high 
prescription drug prices.53 In these and other cases, some have argued that US patients are in 
effect paying twice, once for the research and a second time for the high prices of the end 
products.9,10 
 While march-in rights were codified in the 1980 legislation, the political process leading 
up to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act11 left the scope of applicability of march-in rights 
unclear, including whether they could be used to reduce consumer prices on products originating 
from government-sponsored research. In the more than three decades since the Bayh-Dole Act, 
petitions for the government to consider march-in rights have been publicly considered only five 
times for four different products—and subsequently rejected each time. With such a lack of 
clarity about march-in rights, we sought to examine their role in the licensing and 
commercialization of health care-related government discoveries and whether using march-in 
rights is a viable strategy to address the rising costs of certain health care products. To 
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qualitatively characterize the viability of the march-in rights, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with key experts involved in the development of the Bayh-Dole Act and the march-in 
rights appeals. Our goal was to determine whether march-in rights effectively ensure access to 
innovative medical technology in which government-funded research has played an essential 
role. 
 Two reports of this work have been previously published (Treasure et al. 2014, Treasure 
et al. 2015).12, 51  
 
Methods 
Data Sources 
We first sought all publicly available documents related to the development of the legislation. 
We did this by reviewing US government databases holding primary source documents 
concerning the Bayh-Dole Act, in addition to PubMed and the legal literature (LexisNexis). 
 Next we reviewed records of past hearings for the march-in rights petitions that were 
publicly considered by the government. We limited our search to hearings on health care 
technology and did not seek out potential uses of the march-in rights in other contexts such as 
defense, environmental policy, and aerospace. 
 
Qualitative Data Collection 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with experts, including key participants in the 
development of the legislation and the disposition of past petitions. Such qualitative research can 
be useful when investigating motives and behavior in a small cohort of subjects with similar 
experiences.13 The topic areas covered were Congress’s intent in creating the march-in rights 
provision, the rationale for past march-in rights petitions, the NIH’s role in evaluating march-in 
rights petitions, the criteria on which march-in rights petitions are evaluated, and 
recommendations to improve the march-in rights policy or, more broadly, the Bayh-Dole Act. 
 We targeted 21 potentially relevant experts in the Bayh-Dole Act and march-in rights 
from the fields of politics, law, business, and health care and public health. Twelve agreed to 
participate, with at least 2 participants representing each of the 4 main categories of expertise. 
All the interviews were conducted between June and August 2013 (Table 1). The median time 
for the telephone interviews was 46 minutes, with a range of between 21 and 64 minutes. The 
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two investigators took notes during the interview, recorded the interviews, and later transcribed 
them. The ethics review board at Harvard Medical School approved the study. 
 
Data Analysis 
To organize the data, we collected the details of the march-in rights cases and identified common 
keywords and themes regarding the march-in rights process. Using these keywords, we analyzed 
the interview transcripts using standard qualitative coding techniques.14,15 Based on a subset of 3 
randomly selected interviews, the investigators independently developed coding schemes for 
organizing the data.16 The coding schemes were then compared and reconciled (NVIVO software 
package, QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) to produce a final coding structure that 
encompassed (1) Congress’s original intent of the march-in rights provisions, (2) the decision 
and steps to file a march-in rights petition, (3) the applicability of march-in rights to the pricing 
and patient access issues, (4) the decision to reject a petition, and (5) recommendations for 
improving march-in rights. 
 
Results 
The Bayh-Dole Act and March-In Rights 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 instituted a government wide policy allowing academic recipients of 
federal funding to seek patents on inventions developed with that funding. Universities or 
academic medical centers were then obligated to license the patents exclusively to small business 
owners and nonprofit research institutions for the purpose of development.17,18 In 1983, the law 
was expanded by executive order to include large corporations. 
 Lawmakers also gave the government the right to “march in” and exercise its residual 
intellectual property rights in the invention. By marching in, the government would grant an 
open license on the intellectual property with the expectation that another commercial entity 
would be able to develop and market the product. The law spelled out 4 circumstances in which 
this power could be used: to reclaim an invention when the licensee had not taken, or was not 
expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application (Clause 
1), to “alleviate health or safety needs” not being reasonably satisfied by the licensee (Clause 2), 
to comply with federal laws or regulations requiring some public use of the invention (Clause 3), 
and to remedy a licensee’s failure to meet the domestic manufacturing requirement (Clause 4).19 
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In Clause 1, the term practical application is defined in 35 USC §201(f) as “establish[ing] that 
the invention is being utilized and that its benefits are . . . available to the public on reasonable 
terms.” 
 Any party that believes a patent license holder has not met 1 of the 4 criteria can submit a 
march-in request to the appropriate US government agency, which, in the case of health care 
products, is usually the NIH. After receiving a petition, the agency considers whether to initiate 
the march-in proceedings. The process begins with an official notice sent to the licensee, who 
then has 30 days to respond. If the response includes a dispute over the charges, a fact-finding 
process is conducted that “shall be as informal as practicable and be consistent with principles of 
fundamental fairness,” including such principles as the right of counsel.20 The contractor has the 
right to appeal to the federal courts a decision to exercise march-in rights. By contrast, 
petitioners do not have the right to appeal the decision to not exercise march-in rights.21 
 
Outcomes of Past March-In Rights Petitions 
 CellPro Petition for Ceprate SC (1997).  The first time that march-in rights were 
seriously considered arose out of a dispute between a start-up biotechnology company, CellPro, 
and Baxter Healthcare Corporation, a large medical products manufacturer. A pediatric 
oncologist, Curt Civin, and his colleagues at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine discovered 
the technology at issue. Conducting research in 1981 funded by the National Cancer Institute, 
other foundation grants, and institutional support, Civin and his team developed a series of 
monoclonal antibodies against an antigen family (CD34) on undifferentiated stem cells. One of 
those antibodies was IgG myeloid-10 (My-10). The antibody was potentially useful in treating 
hematologic malignancies like leukemia because it could help separate undifferentiated stem 
cells from cancerous descendant cells during a bone marrow transplant. Johns Hopkins filed a 
patent application in 1984, which was granted for the My-10 antibody and all other antibodies 
that recognize the CD34 antigen. According to Civin, “We patented the antibody itself and the 
whole class of antibodies against CD34. We patented the antigen. We patented the cells and we 
patented the procedure for the technology for immunopurifying hematopoietic stem cells from 
the bone marrow.”22 Johns Hopkins subsequently licensed these patents to Becton-Dickinson & 
Company. 
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 The march-in rights controversy arose because after Civin’s discovery of My-10, 
scientists at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle created an IgM monoclonal 
antibody against CD34, called 12-8, that recognized a CD34 binding site distinct from My-10’s 
binding site. The 12-8 antibody was published in 1986 but not patented.23 The 12-8 antibody was 
useful in a process developed and patented by Hutchinson scientist Ronald Berenson to purify 
CD34-positive stem cells using the proteins biotin and avidin. Berenson’s technology formed the 
basis for creating CellPro, which developed the technology into the Ceprate SC tool for 
separating bone marrow cells. 
 CellPro knew early on that the Hopkins patents existed, although it received legal counsel 
that the Hopkins patents were invalid because they were too broad, covering antibodies to CD34 
that Civin did not discover, and because they were publicly disclosed more than a year before the 
application. Nonetheless, CellPro sought licenses for the patents, first from Becton-Dickinson 
and then in January 1992 from Baxter, to which Becton-Dickinson had exclusively sublicensed 
the patents. Baxter offered a nonexclusive license to CellPro for a greater royalty than it received 
from other licensees, perhaps because Baxter saw CellPro as a potential competitor. The 
companies could not reach agreement, and CellPro preemptively sued to invalidate the Civin 
patents in April 1992.24 CellPro’s Ceparate SC was approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1996. 
 In March 1997, as the years of patent litigation were reaching their conclusion, CellPro 
requested that the NIH assert its march-in rights and grant an open license to the Civin My-10 
patents. CellPro cited Clause 1 (to reclaim an invention that had not been developed or 
commercialized in a reasonable length of time) and Clause 2 (to alleviate health or safety needs 
not being reasonably satisfied by the licensee) as the bases for its petition. CellPro pointed to the 
long delays in Baxter’s development, the licensing terms that Baxter offered to it, and the fact 
that it had an approved and marketed technology. By contrast, Baxter’s Isolex had only recently 
filed for FDA approval, in February 1997. CellPro supported its claims by pointing to Johns 
Hopkins’s controversial patents, claiming, “CellPro does not use the My-10 antibody discovered 
by Dr. Civin. It is only because the patent claims were written too broadly . . . that there is even 
an issue.” After the petition was filed, former Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), cosponsor of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, wrote a letter to the NIH supporting CellPro’s request for march-in rights use “to 
ensure that an important new medical product will be available for use in this country.”25 
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 The NIH investigated the matter in detail to determine whether Baxter had failed to take, 
or was not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical 
application of the subject invention (Clause 1) and whether a public health or safety need was not 
reasonably satisfied (Clause 2). The NIH concluded that Baxter had a promising product in 
development and ultimately secured a promise from the company to allow Ceprate on the market 
until Isolex was approved by the FDA (which occurred in 1999). Thus, in August 1997, the NIH 
did not initiate the formal proceedings to invoke march-in rights. The NIH remarked that it was 
wary “of forced attempts to influence the marketplace for the benefit of a single company, 
particularly when such actions may have far-reaching repercussions on many companies’ and 
investors’ future willingness to invest in federally-funded medical technologies.”26 
 The NIH’s decision was a final blow to CellPro, which had received in the previous 
month a federal district court decision upholding Hopkins’s patents and finding CellPro guilty of 
willful patent infringement.27 CellPro paid a penalty of more than $15 million, was forced to file 
for bankruptcy, and went out of business. No entity purchased the rights to the Ceprate system 
out of bankruptcy, and Baxter later withdrew Isolex from the market. 
 Essential Inventions Petitions for Ritonavir (2004, 2012). The second petition in our 
review was submitted in 2004 by Essential Inventions, a nonprofit organization. The petition 
concerned ritonavir, an HIV protease inhibitor. Ritonavir was developed partially through a $3.5 
million grant from National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to Abbott 
Laboratories from 1988 to 1993. The objective of the grant was to investigate whether medicines 
could be created to block HIV protease enzymes and inhibit the spread of AIDS. Abbott received 
this grant under the National Cooperative Drug Discovery Group for AIDS, a federally chartered 
program created in response to the HIV/AIDS health crisis in the 1980s. The purpose of the 
funding awarded through this program was to promote synergy among government, industry, and 
academic laboratories to translate basic research findings regarding HIV into novel antiretroviral 
therapies. According to Abbott’s principal investigator, this grant “catalyzed the development of 
the antiretroviral program.”28 
 The Abbott scientists’ work was highly successful, and the FDA approved ritonavir in 
1996. It was originally prescribed as a component of highly active antiretroviral therapy 
(HAART), even though the drug’s adverse effects—gastrointestinal symptoms, paresthesias, and 
elevated serum triglycerides—greatly limited its use.29 The viability of ritonavir in the 
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marketplace, however, was saved by another characteristic of the drug: its ability to work as a 
pharmacokinetic enhancer of other protease inhibitors. Even at a very low dose, ritonavir slowed 
the cytochrome P450-3A4 enzymatic system in the liver. Physicians began using, and Abbott 
began promoting, low-dose ritonavir dosing schedules that allowed it to potentiate the activity of 
other protease inhibitors used in HAART—most of which were metabolized in the same 
enzymatic cascade—while avoiding ritonavir’s side effects. In 2000, Abbott received approval 
for a new protease inhibitor, lopinavir, in a fixed-dose combination pill with low-dose ritonavir, 
which it called Kaletra. Abbott did not market stand-alone lopinavir.30 
 The controversial move leading to the march-in case occurred in 2004. In prior years, 
Abbott had set a price for ritonavir of $2.14 a unit, in line with the other protease inhibitors. But 
in 2004, Abbott abruptly increased ritonavir’s price for US consumers to $10.71 a unit, raising 
the annual cost of the drug from about $9,000 to $50,000. Yet, Abbott did not similarly adjust 
the price of Kaletra, even though it included ritonavir. As a result, Kaletra became the least 
expensive protease inhibitor regimen for US patients that included the ritonavir-boosting 
supplement. 
 The march-in request for Abbott invoked Clauses (1) and (2) in the Bayh-Dole Act and 
specifically claimed “that the patent owner charges unreasonable prices for ritonavir, harming 
the public.”30 Essential Inventions argued that by raising the price to such a degree, which 
created barriers to access the drug, Abbott harmed HIV patients taking ritonavir in conjunction 
with other protease inhibitors as part of HAART. In particular, the higher drug prices reduced 
patients’ adherence, which is essential in HIV regimens to prevent resistance. The company also 
argued that Abbott acted anti-competitively by compelling patients to switch to the fixed-dose 
Kaletra even if another protease inhibitor was a better fit. Last, Essential Inventions saw this 
petition as a way to start addressing a broader pricing issue, that products resulting from 
“government-funded investments are routinely being priced higher in the United States than they 
are in foreign countries.”30 
 After hearing some preliminary testimony from relevant parties—including Senator 
Bayh, who this time argued against the exercise of march-in rights—the NIH concluded that 
Abbott met the standard for achieving practical application of ritonavir based on the drug’s 
availability for sale and its widespread use by HIV/AIDS patients. The NIH concluded “that the 
extraordinary remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means of controlling prices . . . [that 
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should be] left for Congress to address legislatively” and rejected the petition. The NIH 
considered that the alleged anticompetitive behavior would be better reviewed by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). Private antitrust lawsuits later filed against Abbott’s pricing schemes 
were dismissed in 2009. In the wake of this petition, Abbott agreed to exempt government 
purchasers, both federal Medicaid and state-run AIDS drug assistance programs, from the price 
increase. Private pharmaceutical insurance companies and hospitals thus became the main payers 
of the increased price.31 Additionally, Abbott expanded the eligibility criteria for people seeking 
ritonavir through its charity program. 
 In 2012, a second, follow-up, petition was filed for ritonavir. In it, civil society 
organizations argued that US consumers were being charged 400% more than other high-income 
countries, creating barriers to patient access and placing US employers at an economic 
disadvantage with overseas competitors.32 This petition was rejected in 2013. The NIH 
concluded that AbbVie (Abbott’s new name) had achieved “practical application of Subject 
Patents,” since the drug was available for use and AbbVie had started a “Patient Assistance 
Program” to help patients who could not afford Norvir.33 
Essential Inventions Petitions for Latanoprost (2004). Essential Inventions filed another 
petition concerning Pfizer’s glaucoma medicine, latanoprost (Xalatan) in 2004, shortly after it 
filed its ritonavir petition. Latanoprost was developed with more than $4 million in NIH research 
grant funding to Laszlo Bito, then an associate professor of ocular physiology at Columbia 
University. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Bito’s laboratory developed a compound that 
reduced abnormally elevated intraocular pressure. After successful testing in animal models, Bito 
realized the therapeutic potential of this compound as a treatment for glaucoma, and Columbia 
filed for a patent on the compound in 1982. Columbia’s patent contains specific language 
identifying the invention as developed under research supported by the National Eye Institute. 
Latanoprost was subsequently exclusively licensed from Columbia University to Pharmacia 
Corporation in 1983. Pharmacia was acquired by Pfizer in 2003.34 
 The march-in petition against latanoprost claimed that the US prices of the drug were 2 to 
5 times higher than in other high-income countries—invoking Clauses (1) and (2)—despite US 
taxpayers’ funding its early development. In 2004, a 2.5 mL bottle cost $19.56 in Canada but 
$50.99 in the United States. The petition argued that the “reasonable terms” clause implied a 
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reasonable price and that this discriminatory pricing was causing disparities in access, creating a 
public health crisis. 
 The NIH disagreed. It rejected the petition for march-in rights use, claiming that Pfizer 
met the standard for achieving practical application and reiterating its contention from the Abbott 
case that the march-in process should not be a means of controlling prices. 
 Fabry’s Disease Patients’ Petition for Fabrazyme (2010). In the fourth petition, patients 
with Fabry’s disease requested an open license for agalsidase beta (Fabrazyme), the only enzyme 
replacement therapy approved by the FDA to treat their disease. Fabry’s disease is a hereditary 
lysosomal storage disease characterized by a lack of alpha-galactosidase enzyme. Chronic 
enzyme replacement therapy can allow patients to avoid end-state renal disease, cerebrovascular 
damage, severe neuropathic limb pain, and cardiovascular manifestations such as left ventricular 
hypertrophy, heart failure, and valve abnormalities.35 Agalsidase beta enzyme replacement 
therapy was developed by Robert Desnick and others at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine 
with more than $4.1 million in NIH funding. Desnick patented the compound in 1990 and then 
licensed it exclusively to Genzyme, which further developed and commercialized it. 
 The FDA approved agalsidase beta in 2003. Another enzyme replacement therapy for 
Fabry’s disease, agalsidase alfa (Replagal), was approved in Europe in 2001. Made by Shire, it 
was never submitted to the FDA for approval after the FDA granted orphan-drug status to 
Fabrazyme, which gave Genzyme seven years of market exclusivity from competitors seeking to 
market the same drug for the same condition.36 After losing the race to market in the United 
States, Shire withdrew its product from consideration in the United States and focused on the 
European market. 
 The controversy leading to the march-in rights petition emerged from a crisis in 2009, 
when viral contamination in a Genzyme manufacturing facility in Massachusetts shut down 
production. As a result, Genzyme could produce only enough of the drug to meet 38% of the US 
demand, and patients had to ration their treatment. Accordingly, dosage was cut by 62%, and no 
new patients were allowed to start taking agalsidase beta. 
 In 2010, three patients with Fabry’s disease petitioned the NIH to exercise its march-in 
rights, invoking Clauses (1) and (2). The petitioners argued that Genzyme “has not satisfied and 
cannot reasonably satisfy the health and safety needs of Fabry patients by rationing drugs while 
preventing additional sources of manufacture.” Indeed, they found evidence that during the 
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shortage, Genyzme sent the majority of its agalsidase beta produced in US facilities to meet its 
obligations in Europe so that it could continue to compete with Shire’s agalsidase alfa. The 
petitioners believed that these actions demonstrated that Genzyme was not taking steps to 
achieve practical application of the invention. 
 The NIH rejected the petition for march-in rights use on December 2, 2010, claiming that 
granting the petition would not “address the problem identified by the Requestors.” The NIH 
argued that granting an open license through march-in rights would not increase the supply of 
Fabrazyme in the short term. At this time, Shire offered to manufacture and market agalsidase 
alfa (Replagal) in the United States, since this drug’s efficacy was similar to Genzyme’s 
agalsidase beta in treating Fabry’s disease in Europe. But the FDA would not approve it based on 
the European data alone and requested a clinical trial comparing agalsidase alfa and agalsidase 
beta. Neither company wanted to pursue this because of the financial cost and market-share 
ramifications. As the shortage continued, the petitioners filed a citizen petition, asking the FDA 
to approve agalsidase alfa for short-term use, but the petition was never answered. In its response 
to the march-in rights petition, the NIH did not directly address the potential for agalsidase alfa 
use in the United States. It maintained that if a company had a viable plan to obtain FDA 
approval for agalsidase beta during the period that Genzyme was not able to meet demand, the 
NIH would reconsider its decision to exercise its march-in authority. The NIH also cited 
Genzyme’s claim that full production would return in early 2011 and stated that the NIH would 
monitor Genzyme’s production efforts by receiving monthly reports from original licensor, 
Mount Sinai. Ultimately, the shortage was resolved in 2012. In July 2014, Knowledge Ecology 
International submitted a letter to the FTC urging it to investigate the “decision made by Shire 
not to compete in the US market for Fabry’s disease treatments.”37 
 
Two Views of March-In Rights 
Our interview results generally fell into two dominant themes with respect to the questions of 
how march-in rights have functioned in the past and their role in the marketplace. One group of 
interviewees (‘March in Rights Work Well’) saw march-in rights as an extreme option intended 
to address situations in which products were truly unavailable and as inapplicable to situations 
characterized by high prices alone. The other major perspective (‘Reasonable Terms Should 
Include Price’) favored applying march-in rights to help address major inequities in the cost and 
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availability of health care products arising from federally funded research. Table 2 presents 
representative quotations from each viewpoint.  
 
 March-In Rights Work Well, Are Not Intended for Price-Setting.  
One of the two prevailing themes from our interviewees was that the current commercialization 
system under Bayh-Dole is achieving its intended purpose, as evidenced by the many products 
that have arisen from federally funded research since 1980. To these interviewees, the policy was 
intended to ensure commercialization, so that developments “were not left on the shelf,” with the 
march-in rights serving as a safeguard to protect against a very narrow set of highly undesirable 
outcomes, such as products being acquired and intentionally not developed. To these 
interviewees, the fact that march-in rights have never been used does not mean that the policy is 
not working; instead, it is evidence of a system working as intended, in that the march-in rights 
cast a powerful shadow over government-sponsored research, making it less likely that 
companies obtaining the rights to this research would conduct themselves in ways that 
undermined the public health. In particular, the interviewees argued that the march-in rights have 
empowered grantees, commonly academic centers, to engage in the oversight of licensed 
products that has likely led to the selection of better developers. 
 Those interviewees adhering to this view also pointed out that the NIH’s consideration of 
march-in rights petitions in the Abbott and CellPro cases led to minor concessions on the part of 
the rights holders, as Abbott agreed to lower the price of ritonavir for US government purchasers 
and Baxter agreed to let the CellPro device remain on the market until its own product was 
approved by the FDA. Thus, the interviewees perceived that the existence of march-in rights, 
even without their fulfillment, might motivate parties to uphold the public health goals of the 
Bayh-Dole Act. 
 The interviewees attributed the government’s hesitancy to intervene through march-in 
rights as being related to the negative ramifications of the drug and health-technology 
development process. They discussed the uncertainty and expense inherent in the innovation 
process and theorized that granting march-in rights would deter future participants from 
commercializing other government-sponsored research. The reason was the possibility that an 
exclusive license that could be broken in extreme circumstances could diminish a licensee’s 
confidence in acquiring the license and subsequently investing the substantial sums required to 
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develop the product and to conduct the clinical trials needed to bring a therapeutic to market. In 
addition, the development of a marketable product from licensed patents inevitably generates a 
considerable amount of know-how leading to more patents that would not be covered by march-
in rights, as illustrated in the Fabrazyme march-in case. To some interviewees, these facts 
support the impracticality of applying march-in rights to marketed products. 
 The interviewees pointed to the NIH’s public responses to these five march-in cases as 
confirmation that it has been consistent in asserting its disinclination to become a “price-setting” 
agency. Indeed, they argued that granting march-in rights is outside the scope of the NIH as a 
research-funding agency and that it does not have the institutional competence to police 
development contracts of its extramural grantees. As additional evidence of the potential 
problems that might arise were the NIH to move beyond its traditional role and regulate drug 
prices, two interviewees cited an episode from 1989 when the NIH adopted a “reasonable pricing 
clause” in its cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) in response to the 
outcry over the high price of zidovudine (Retrovir). Zidovudine was discovered by Jerome 
Horwitz at the Karmanos Cancer Institute in Michigan, and it was then shown to be active 
against HIV based on testing led by Samuel Broder at the NIH. But zidovudine was sold for 
$8,000 per year by Burroughs Wellcome as the HIV epidemic spread, beyond what many 
patients with HIV could afford, particularly with an estimated 35% having no prescription drug 
insurance at the time.38 The CRADA pricing policy was then eliminated in 1995 based on 
widespread recognition that it was causing the industry to avoid even potentially beneficial 
collaboration with government scientists. 
 In summary, the interviewees ascribing to this narrative believed that march-in rights 
were intended to be a tool to promote commercialization. Thus, as long as technologies on the 
market are being sold, even if the price is somewhat higher than consumers would like, the goal 
of the Bayh-Dole Act has been achieved. These interviewees interpreted the text of the march-in 
rights provision as not suggesting or insinuating that high prices justified the use of march-in 
rights. They often cited later comments on this issue by Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole 
(R-Kans.): “Bayh-Dole did not intend that government set prices on resulting products. The law 
makes no reference to a reasonable price that should be dictated by the government.”39 
 
 “Reasonable Terms” Should Include Price, Discrepancies in Access Exist. 
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The other primary perspective from the interviewees was that the march-in rights provision could 
reasonably be applied to address serious inequities in the prices of products originating from 
federally funded research. According to this view, the Bayh-Dole Act led to an increase in 
commercialization, and the march-in rights were established to ensure that US citizens could 
access the benefits of federally funded developments. Since tax dollars contribute to health care 
innovation both indirectly and directly,40 the US public has the right to access these technologies 
under reasonable terms, which can imply reasonable prices in certain circumstances. Yet, access 
on reasonable terms has not always been met. 
 Two interviewees traced the origin of ambiguity in the “reasonable terms” language to 
the development of the law. The Bayh-Dole Act originally pertained to small business owners 
and nonprofit research institutions. It was later expanded to include large for-profit companies 
via an executive order from then president Ronald Reagan. This might explain why the potential 
for profit incentives to lead to higher drug prices was not explicitly addressed in the writing of 
the law, even if the discussion before the law’s passage suggested that legislators considered it to 
be incorporated in the act’s language. 
 The interviewees pointed to the outcomes of these five petitions as evidence that the 
system was structured so as to make it impossible to implement march-in rights in the way it 
might have been intended. For example, in the march-in procedure, the patent holder can appeal 
the granting of the request to the courts, whereas the petitioner does not have the appeal option if 
the petition is rejected. This asymmetry could be a deterrent to march-in rights petitions as well 
as to the NIH’s invoking march-in rights. Furthermore, this group of interviewees also believed 
that the NIH is not equipped to address and implement a request for march-in rights. The NIH 
does not have the capability or the human capital to perform the detailed economic analysis and 
regulatory navigation required to implement a march-in request. Thus, the interviewees believed 
that there had been clear instances in which march-in petitions should have been filed and 
march-in rights should have been used but that procedures favoring inaction had deterred their 
use. 
 Finally, these interviewees believed that in certain instances, the march-in rights policy 
should be used as a counterweight to the high prices of health care products developed from 
federal funding. They believe there have been multiple cases in which high-cost health 
technology had created disparities in access that resulted in a public health need warranting the 
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use of march-in rights. The march-in rights policy requires the contractor to provide the 
inventions “upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstance.” These interviewees believe 
the intention of statutory language is ambiguous and argue that if pricing affects access, the 
reasonable terms clause can include reasonable pricing. The US government and its people, the 
largest public contributor to global scientific research and development, should not be paying the 
world’s highest prices for drugs that it helped develop. 
 
Discussion 
Since 1980, the NIH has publicly reviewed five petitions requesting exercise of march-in rights 
related to four different health-related technologies or medicines developed from federal funding. 
In each of these circumstances, the NIH rejected the requests. Thus, since it was enacted 36 years 
ago, the march-in rights provision has remained unused, despite billions of dollars of 
government-sponsored research and the development of scores of transformative products 
emerging from such investments over this time. 
 Yet march-in rights petitions continue to be filed by policymakers and invoked by 
advocates, most commonly in the context of high-cost new products developed from 
government-funded research. In reviewing the details of past march-in rights cases and the 
opinions of our interviewees, we found what appears to be a solid legal basis for considering the 
excessively high price of a product to be a valid reason to invoke march-in rights. The legislative 
history of the Bayh-Dole Act and the plain language of the statute establish that the “reasonable 
terms” should take price into account, particularly if it is blatantly unreasonable and a key factor 
in limiting access to the product.41 
 We also found convincing arguments from our interviewees about a regulatory and 
political climate offering little prospect that march-in rights would be invoked to regulate pricing 
of a health care product developed from federal funding. Several of the previous march-in rights 
petitions have outlined the detrimental effects of high prices on both US consumers and the 
economy. Yet march-in rights were not invoked in these cases, and it is difficult to envision more 
compelling scenarios, outside a price so exorbitant that a majority of patients and payers could 
simply not afford it (a still unrealistic hypothetical situation). Furthermore, there is wide 
agreement on the NIH’s hesitancy to intervene: the NIH is both ill equipped to invoke a march-in 
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petition and wary of the potentially negative ramifications that the enactment of march-in rights 
under Bayh-Dole could have on future commercialization. 
 If policy-makers seek to use expand the existing march-in rights policy to augment use, it 
would require reforms at several levels. Review could be assigned to another government agency 
more equipped to assess market mechanisms and access discrepancies. For instance, the Federal 
Trade Commission has the economic expertise and capacity for analyzing market dynamics and 
could be poised to better evaluate the benefits and risks of exercising march-in rights.   
 Additionally, change could be achieved through more local action. University technology 
transfer offices often consider the potential public benefit of their patented products, in addition 
to profit for their institutions. If universities issued more nonexclusive licenses of their products, 
there would be less need to rely on march-in rights.  Even though nonexclusive licenses may 
elicit lower royalty rates, they can be successful in helping bring to market essential therapeutic 
technologies. For instance, the Axel patents of Columbia University claimed the method for 
introducing foreign protein into cells, and Stanford and University of California’s Cohen-Boyer 
patents covered methods of gene cloning and expression. Because these discoveries were made 
before the Bayh-Dole Act was ratified and codified universities’ rights to exclusive relationships, 
the universities pursued numerous non-exclusive licenses instead of exclusive ones. Ultimately, 
many companies developed and utilized these technologies, leading to a variety of useful 
therapeutic products. The Axel licenses earned more than $800 million in revenue and the 
Cohen-Boyer licenses earned more than $250 million for their respective universities.49 Although 
non-exclusive licensing of intellectually property has gained support among some universities 
researchers,50 companies generally consider nonexclusive licenses less attractive investments. 
Thus, other legislative strategies may be needed to incentivize nonexclusive licensing of drugs 
and other products for which development was based heavily on federal support.  
 It is worth noting that march-in rights and nonexclusive licenses are not the only 
mechanisms available to public health advocates seeking to improve access or reduce high prices 
related to medical products arising from federally funded research. Another option might be to 
promote transparency in price setting. For example, recently proposed legislation in California 
would require manufacturers to publicly disclose their drug development costs, which could 
provide greater accountability and justification for pricing.42 Still another option—though 
similarly unlikely to lead to the initiation of march-in rights in the current political climate—
! ! !! "*!
would be for the United States to establish an agency modeled after the United Kingdom’s 
National Institute for Health Care Excellence (NICE) that could guide “fair” pricing through cost 
effectiveness analysis. 
 Additionally, as once suggested by Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.),43 the NIH could 
establish “payback” terms for drugs or technologies developed with federally funded patents.44 
Licenses for federally funded developments between universities and commercial entities would 
contain royalty terms. The company would then take the development through clinical trials and 
FDA approval, and if the product were profitable, it would pay a small royalty to the government 
to allow investment in further research. The director of the NIH, Francis Collins, has endorsed 
this model as an acceptable alternative to an NIH-imposed oversight of prices.45 Not only would 
this model allow companies to maintain pricing flexibility, but it also would provide the NIH 
with funding for future research. 
 Of course, even without the realistic prospect of invoking march-in rights, the US 
government maintains the power to claim access to any patented product, regardless of its 
funding sources, by issuing a compulsory license, in exchange for reasonable compensation.46 
This process, which in the past has provided access to items needed for warfare that nonetheless 
infringe on patents, can be implemented directly by executive branch agencies without 
congressional approval, circumventing the bureaucratic steps of the march-in rights proceedings. 
The last time such a measure was invoked in the context of health care products was in 2001 
during the anthrax scare, when the government was seeking to stockpile the antibiotic 
ciprofloxacin (Cipro) and Bayer offered a high price. Faced with the threat of a compulsory 
license, Bayer reduced its price by 50%.47,48 
 
Conclusion 
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to make the fruits of publicly funded research broadly 
available, and included a provision for ‘march-in’ rights to ensure the products of the investment 
would be made available to patients on reasonable terms. Yet, as the US government continues 
to invest in basic scientific research that will ultimately lead to commercially successful medical 
products, debates persist over access to and the costs of such products. Can the government’s 
march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act help address these concerns? Our review suggests that 
the answer is generally no. At least under the current regulatory structure, the NIH will not 
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intervene in the marketing of products that it or its grantees have helped discover, and march-in 
rights are not a viable strategy to address the cost of health care products developed from public 
funding. Based on experience to date, march-in rights may be useful only for cases in which a 
government-sponsored technology is licensed and then intentionally undeveloped, or for help in 
extracting minor concessions from licensors in extreme circumstances. 
 As federally funded research continues to contribute to the discovery of important new 
medications, policy makers will need to revisit the Bayh-Dole Act to devise a better safety net to 
ensure equitable access to taxpayer-funded discoveries.  
 
Summary:   
• The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 formalized the process of universities licensing patents 
developed from federally funded research to commercial entities. This legislation also 
contained a march-in rights provision, whereby the US government could exercise its 
authority and cancel the exclusive license if the licensee was not taking adequate steps to 
commercialize or not meeting the needs of the American public.  
• There have been 5 march-in rights petitions for 4 different products. More recently, 
march-in rights petitions have been invoked in the context of high-cost medical products 
that were developed in part with government funding. However, the NIH has rejected 
every march-in rights petition. To gain a better understanding of this policy, we both 
examined each petition and conducted semi-structured interview with key experts.  
• The interviewees were split on the implications of the rejection of the march-in rights 
petitions, either finding the NIH’s reluctance to invoke march-in rights to be evidence of 
either a system working as intended or of a flawed system needing reform. 
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Table 1. List of Experts in Bayh-Dole Act and March-In Rights Petitions 51 
Name How Identified 
(expertise) 
Current Position Summary of Role 
Joseph Allen Bayh-Dole literature 
(politics) 
President of 
consulting firm 
focused on US 
technology transfer 
Helped draft Bayh-
Dole Act as member 
of Senator Birch 
Bayh’s staff 
Allen Black, JD NIH record search 
(law) 
Private patent attorney Key author of 
agalsidase beta 
petition 
Howard Bremer, JD NIH record search 
(politics, law) 
Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation 
(WARF), emeritus 
patent counsel 
Helped draft Bayh-
Dole Act 
Curt Civin, MD NIH record search 
and medical literature 
(health care/public 
health) 
Professor at 
University of 
Maryland School of 
Medicine 
Discovered the 
antibody technology 
licensed to Baxter that 
was the basis for the 
CellPro petition 
Robert Cook-Deegan, 
MD 
Medical literature 
(health care / public 
health) 
Research professor, 
Duke University 
Academic research on 
patents and 
technology transfer 
James Love Medical literature, 
NIH record search 
(health care / public 
health) 
President of 
Knowledge Ecology 
International 
Key author of 
ritonavir and 
latanoprost petitions 
Barbara McGarey, JD Medical literature 
(law) 
General counsel for 
Public Health, 
National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) 
Deputy director, NIH 
Office of Technology 
Transfer during the 
CellPro petition 
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Richard Murdock Medical literature 
(business) 
American business 
executive 
President of CellPro 
at time of petition 
John Raubitschek, JD Referral (politics, 
law) 
Attorney for Defense 
Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy 
Division, US 
Department of 
Defense 
Helped draft 
regulations to 
implement Bayh-Dole 
Act 
Daniel Ravicher, JD NIH record search 
(law) 
Executive director, 
Public Patent 
Foundation 
Provided testimony 
related to first 
ritonavir petition 
Mark Rohrbaugh, 
PhD, JD 
NIH record search 
(law) 
Director, NIH Office 
of Technology 
Transfer 
Oversees office that 
has responsibility for 
reviewing march-in 
rights petitions 
Teri Willey, MBA Referral, NIH record 
search (business) 
Vice president, Mount 
Sinai Innovation 
Partners 
Past president, 
Association for 
University 
Technology 
Managers, helps 
manage agalsidase 
beta license at Mount 
Sinai School of 
Medicine’s 
technology transfer 
office 
Names are in alphabetical order. The presence of an interview source on this list does not imply 
endorsement of the article or its findings. 
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Table 2. Representative Quotations Supporting and Opposing Use of March-In Rights to 
Address High Prices of Health Care Products Arising from Federally Funded Research 51  
Topic Interviewees Responses 
Believing March-In Rights Not 
Intended for Price-Setting 
Interviewees Responses Believing 
March-In Rights Applicable to 
Addressing High Prices 
Are high prices of 
government-
sponsored discoveries 
a problem? 
“If you look at all the public policy 
issues surrounding drug pricing 
and access to healthcare it’s a 
much bigger issue. [This pricing 
issue] doesn’t really get solved by 
having a subset of inventions and 
healthcare products and 
diagnostics or treatments or 
vaccines that arise out of NIH-
funded research.” 
“We found that 13 of the 14 drugs 
that we looked at with government 
rights in them were priced higher in 
the United States than in any other 
country. . . . Pricing is a broad issue. 
Government funded investments are 
routinely being priced higher in the 
United States than they are in foreign 
countries . . . countries we compete 
against in the market.” 
Role of government 
in drug pricing 
“Our concern under Bayh-Dole 
was ‘We want to make sure these 
things are being used. We want to 
get them off the shelf. Get them 
out there where the taxpayers can 
use them.’ That was really the 
essence of Bayh-Dole. We had no 
interest at all in trying to regulate 
what the prices could be because 
that’s a whole different thing—I 
don’t even know how you would 
do that, but you certainly wouldn’t 
do it under a tech transfer bill.” 
“The federal government should 
consider rising health care costs when 
considering march-in . . . Bayh-Dole 
just opened the floodgates for federal 
funding to private companies. But 
there’s got to be some measure of 
control over that. There are cases 
where it [march-in process] absolutely 
should be granted . . . for the purpose 
of making sure that the government-
funded technology is efficiently and 
appropriately developed.” 
Bayh-Dole statutory 
language 
“‘Reasonable terms’ means 
reasonable terms in the license . . . 
pricing should not be considered.” 
“What is ‘reasonable terms’? Can you 
imagine what kind of reasonable 
terms are you talking about? Charging 
Americans 400 times more than 
foreigners? The law says ‘Available 
to the public on reasonable terms.’ 
What does ‘available to the public’ 
mean? It means something, right?” 
Feasibility of march- “I think [march-in rights] play an “The value of the march-in seems to 
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in rights being 
invoked 
important background role . . . 
primarily as a warning or potential 
punishment to those who would 
violate the statute.” 
be almost exclusively as a negotiating 
tool, but nobody really thinks that it 
has any credibility as such a tool 
because nobody ever expects NIH to 
march-in.” 
“I also think NIH has absolutely zero 
competence and zero interest in 
getting involved in access to 
healthcare products and services. 
They’re a research agency and the 
whole norm of the culture at NIH is 
supportive research and much less 
about making sure that it gets 
incorporated equitably into the 
healthcare system.” 
 
